From Nutmeg Wars to Domination
This post explores the dark undercurrents of the market economy, tracing its violent colonial roots and questioning the common myths of its origins. Drawing from history, anthropology, and the work of David Graeber, it challenges mainstream economic narratives and highlights the human cost behind capitalism’s foundations—from the spice trade in the Banda Islands to the coercive systems of debt in early modern Europe.

Originally published in Substack https://substack.com/home/post/p-162823221
In 1599, a Dutch expedition contacted the chiefs of the Banda Islands, famed for their nutmeg, to negotiate an agreement. The appeal and value of nutmeg were heightened by the fact that it grew nowhere else. The Dutch forbade the islanders from selling spices to representatives of other countries. However, the Banda islanders resisted the Dutch demand for a monopoly over the spice trade. In response, the Dutch East India Company—VOC (Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie)—decided to conquer the islands by force. The company launched several military campaigns against the islanders, aided by Japanese mercenaries and samurai.
The conquest, which began in 1609, culminated in a massacre: VOC forces killed 2,800 Bandanese and enslaved 1,700. Weakened by hunger and ongoing conflict, the islanders felt powerless to resist and began negotiating surrender in 1621. The VOC official Jan Pieterszoon Coen (1587–1629) deported the remaining 1,000 islanders to what is now Jakarta. With the resistance crushed, the Dutch secured a monopoly over the spice trade, which they held until the 19th century. During the Napoleonic Wars, the British temporarily seized control of the islands and transferred nutmeg plants to Sri Lanka and Singapore.
In the 2020s, a statue of Jan Pieterszoon Coen erected in 1893 in the Dutch city of Hoorn has faced similar criticism to the statues of Robert E. Lee in the United States and Cecil Rhodes in Cape Town, South Africa. Defenders of the statue view it as a sacred symbol of secular Dutch identity.
Even though the business-as-usual attitude accelerating today’s ecological crisis may not entail the displacement of indigenous peoples by samurai and their replacement with slaves, the market economy undeniably has a dirty side.
Settler histories and forced migration
In 2010, I visited Amsterdam with my friend who was born in South Africa. He suggested we visit the VOC’s 17th-century headquarters, the Oost-Indisch Huis. The building is strikingly unassuming. Located at Oude Hoogstraat 24, a small passageway leads to a modest courtyard. At the back stands a three-storey building with a single small door, two windows on the left and one on the right. Staring into this minimal yet somehow claustrophobically ominous space, it’s difficult to comprehend the VOC’s profound impact on the world—comparable only to that of its British counterpart, the East India Company (EIC).
These joint-stock companies, founded in the early 1600s and backed by private armies and nearly limitless power, helped establish a system in which investors could profit from enterprise success by purchasing shares. Standing in that courtyard, my friend recounted how his Dutch ancestors had little choice in the mid-1600s but to board ships bound for what is now South Africa. He spoke of an uncle who spent his entire life in the Karoo desert herding sheep, never eating anything that didn’t come from a sheep. South African history is filled with such solitary shepherds.
Indeed, the VOC was so concerned about these isolated sheep farmers and the continuation of white European populations in the African wilderness that they abducted young girls from Amsterdam orphanages and shipped them to Africa to become wives for the shepherds.
Anthropologist David Graeber (2011) explores the common belief that markets and money evolved from a barter system—a view popularised by Scottish moral philosopher Adam Smith in his 1776 work An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. Smith argued against the idea that money was a state invention. Following the liberal philosophical tradition of John Locke, who believed that governments existed to protect private property and functioned best when limited to that role, Smith extended the theory by claiming that property, money, and markets predated political institutions. According to Smith, these were the foundations of civilisation, and governments should confine themselves to guaranteeing the value of currency.
Graeber, however, challenges this assumption. He asks whether there has ever been a point in human history when people lived in a pure barter economy, as Smith claimed. His research finds no such evidence. Barter economies only existed in contexts where people were already familiar with cash.
Graeber introduces the term ”human economies” to describe anthropological cases in which value was measured according to personal honour and social standing. These systems are well-documented in ancient Greece, medieval Ireland, and among Indigenous cultures in Africa and the Americas. For most of human history, people didn’t need money or other exchange mediums to get what they needed. Help was offered without expectation of compensation. In human economies, value was attached only to human life, honour, and dignity.
Human economies and the value of honour
Written records in Ireland begin around 600 AD, by which time the once-thriving slave trade had already ceased. While the rest of Europe used Roman-inspired coinage, Ireland—lacking significant mineral wealth—did not. Its 150 kings could only trade for foreign luxury goods using cattle and people, which thus became the de facto currency. By the Middle Ages, the slave trade had ended, much like elsewhere in Europe. The collapse of slavery was a major consequence of the fall of the Roman Empire.
Medieval Irish lived on scattered farmsteads, growing wheat and raising livestock. There were no real towns, except those that formed around monasteries. Money served purely social purposes: for gifts, payments to artisans, doctors, poets, judges, entertainers, and for feudal obligations. Tellingly, lawmakers of the time didn’t even know how to price goods. Everyday objects were never exchanged for money. Food was shared within families or sent to lords who hosted feasts for friends, rivals, and vassals.
In such societies, honour and social status were everything. Though physical items had no monetary value, a person’s honour carried a precisely defined price. The most esteemed figures—kings, bishops, and master poets—had an ”honour price” equivalent to seven slave girls. Although slavery had ended, it remained a conceptual unit of value. Seven slave girls equalled 21 dairy cows and 21 ounces of silver.
Throughout history, human value—whether defined by honour or tangible worth—often served as the original measure of price, even when nothing else required valuation. One root of cash-based economies lies in the conduct of large-scale wars. For example, in Sumerian Mesopotamia, silver reserves were stored in temples merely as collateral in case debts had to be settled. The entire Sumerian economy was based on credit. Though silver backed these arrangements, it typically sat untouched inside temple vaults.
In such systems, not even kings could obtain anything they simply desired. But temple-held silver could be stolen—and the first coins likely arose this way. For instance, Alexander the Great’s (356–323 BC) vast conquests necessitated paying his soldiers, and what better means than minting coins from looted silver? This pattern is evident wherever money first emerged. Crucially, such systems required slavery. War captives—slaves—played a vital role in defining human value and, by extension, the value of all things. They also laboured in the extraction of key minerals like silver.
Military-coinage-slavery complex
Graeber (2011) refers to this dynamic as the military-coinage-slavery complex. Similar developments appeared around 2,500 years ago across the Western world, the Middle East, India, and China. Money remains deeply entangled with power and freedom. As Graeber notes, anyone working for money understands that true freedom is largely an illusion. Much of the violence has been pushed out of sight—but we can no longer even imagine a world based on social credit arrangements without surveillance systems, weapons, tasers, or security cameras.
Cash fundamentally altered the nature of economic systems. Initially, it was used primarily for transactions with strangers and for paying taxes. In Europe, up until the end of the Middle Ages, systems based on mutual aid and credit were more common than cash purchases.
The origins of the market economy lie in the collapse of trust between traditional communities, replaced by the impersonal force of markets. Human-based credit economies were transformed into interest-bearing debt systems. Moral networks gave way to debt structures upheld by vengeful and violent states. For instance, a 17th-century urban resident could not count on the legal system, even when technically in the right. Under Elizabeth I (1558–1603), the punishment for vagrancy—meaning unemployment—began with having one’s ears nailed to a post. Repeat offenders faced death. The same logic applied to debt: creditors could pursue repayment as though it were a crime.
Graeber gives the example of Margaret Sharples, who in 1660 was prosecuted in London for stealing fabric—used to make an underskirt—from Richard Bennett’s shop. She had negotiated the acquisition with Bennett’s servant, promising to pay later. Bennett confirmed she agreed to a price and even paid a deposit, offering valuables as collateral. Yet Bennett returned the deposit and initiated legal proceedings. Sharples was ultimately hanged.
This marks a profound shift in moral obligations and how societies managed debt. Previously, debt was a normal part of social life. But with state systems in place, creditors gained the right to recover their loans with interest—and to sue. Graeber writes:
“The criminalization of debt, then, was the criminalization of the very basis of human society. It cannot be overemphasized that in a small community, everyone normally was both lender and borrower. One can only imagine the tensions and temptations that must have existed in communities … when it became clear that with sufficiently clever scheming, manipulation, and perhaps a bit of strategic bribery, they could arrange to have almost anyone they hated imprisoned or even hanged.” (Graeber 2011, p. 381)
Conclusion
This historical and anthropological lens reveals the market economy not as a neutral or natural evolution, but as a system forged through conquest, coercion, and structural violence. From spice monopolies enforced with massacres to the criminalisation of everyday debt, market capitalism has long relied on hierarchies of power, enforced by law, military, and myth. As we face ecological and moral crises today, understanding this history is crucial to reimagining alternatives rooted in trust, community, and human dignity.
References:
Graeber, D. (2011). Debt: The first 5,000 years. New York: Melville House.
Smith, A. (1776). An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. London, UK: W. Strahan and T. Cadell.







